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RECENT DECISIONS ..
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-PRoCEDURE-PRIMARY JURISDICTION To DETERMINE ILLEGALITY OF CONTRACT UNDER SHIPPING ACT-Plaintiff, an independent shipper, sought review of a Federal Maritime Board order approving
under section 15 of the Shipping Act1 an association;s dual-rate contract
system2 found to be "a necessary competitive measure to offset the effect of
non-conference competition." The court pf appeals s_et aside the Board's
order3 on grounds that the system was prohibited by section 14 Third of
the same act.4 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Coui:t, held,
affirmed, three justices dissenting. A dual-rate contract system found by the
FMB to be designed to meet outside competition is a "resort to other discriminatory or unfair methods" to stifle such competition in violation of
section 14 Third, and is therefore illegal per se. Federal Maritime Board 11.
Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
At once striking about the decision in the principal case is that while
the Court accepts the finding of the FMB that the system was designed to
meet outside competition, it rejects summarily its conclusion that the sys~
tem was "a necessary competitive measure to offset the effect of non-conference competition." The Court substitutes its judgment for that of the
FMB, laying down the broad principle that a dual-rate contract system designed to meet outside competition necessarily stifles that competition and
therefore falls within the prohibition of section 14 Third. With the growing importance of administrative tribunals, a constantly recurring problem
in American law bas been the determination of relative jurisdiction of
court and agency. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has played the
important role in this area of allocating the functions of interpretation and
application of regulatory statutes between the respective bodies.IS This
doctrine has very often been explained in terms of the distinction between

1 Section 15 provides that the Board may " . . . disapprove, cancel, or modify any
agreement . . . that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between
carriers .•. , or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or to
be in violation of this Act, and shall approve all other agreements. . . .'' 39 Stat. 734
(1916), 46 u.s.c. (1952) §814.
2 The system was proposed by the Japan-Atlantic and Gulf Conference. In general,
dual-rate contract systems provide one rate for services to shippers who agree to give
their exclusive patronage to the members of the conference, and a higher rate for identical services to other shippers. The differential is usually fixed, and there is normally
a provision for liquidated damages for failure to give the exclusive patronage contracted
for. See MARX, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CARTELS 207-210 "(1953).
3 Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1956) 239 F. (2d) 933.
4 Section 14 provides: "That no common carrier by water shall.... Third. Retaliate
against any shipper by refusing . . . space accommodations . . . , or resort to other
discriminatory or unfair methods. . . .'' 39 Stat. 733 (1916), 46 U.S.C. (1952) §812.
IS See United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183 at 191- (1939): ·
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questions of law and qu~tio~ of fact, 6 but the value of such a distinction
is doubtfu-1.1 What the courts have regarded as within the initial jurisdiction of the administrative agency has depended largely on factors of policy,8
iµcluding the need for a resort to administrative expertise in resolving
issues not within the conventional experience of judges, and the desirability of employing administrative discretion to settle issues which by
their nature require a particular application of regulatory statutes.9 The
principal case would appear, upon first impression, to be a backward step
in the development of this doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In two earlier
cases, 10 the Supreme Court refused to pass on the legality under section 14
T!tlrd of nearly identical contract systems,11 holding that prior resort to the
FMB was ·necessary. The principal case now holds that whereas the Board
~as pri~ary jurisdiction to determine the intent and effect of the contract
system ~n the ·narrow sense of whether it was -aimed at non-conference compedi:ion, the Court may determine whether the system thus characterized
falls within the statutory condemnation. This would appear to be contrary not only to a great number of decisi<?ns standing for the proposition
tha:f the agency has pnm·ary jurisdiction to determine whether a particular
practice or agreement is "discriminatory" within the meaning of the
'i:egulatory stii.t'!lte,12 but also to an equal number of decisions which accord
to agency determinations of this type a solid degree of conclusiveness.13 It
·wouid'·seem, initially, to be precisely this type of determination which
~ourts.-have traditionally· refused to make in the first instance because of a
need' for a resort to administrative expertise and discretion. Upon closer

any

rat~,

,:

.

.

6 See, e.g., Brown Lumber Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 299 U.S. 393 (1937);
Illinois Central iR. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 206 U.S. 441 (1907). See also
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 666 (1951).·
.
7 The substantive determination of what is for the agency and what is for the court
is difficuit to express in terms of ,two immutable, or even clearly delineated categories.
The characterization as questions of law and of fact seems more of a judicial conclusion
than an explanation or a useful formula. A rationalization of the necessary overlap between questions of law and of fact is the judicial concession that agencies have primary
jurisdiction over "mixed questions of law and fact.'' See, e.g., United States v. Western
Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956). But the limitations of this concession are far from clear.
s See Securities & ·Exchange Commission v. Cogan, (9th Cir. 1952) 201 F. (2d) 78 at
!!4-85. See also DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 55 (1927).
9 See, e.g., Loomis v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 240 U.S. 43 (1916); Texas & Pacific Ry.
Co. v. American Tie & Timber Co., 234 U.S. 138 (1914); Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne,
194- U.S. 106 at 107-108 (1904).
10 United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932), and Far East
Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
11 Principal case at 498.
12 See, e.g., St. Louis, Brownsville & Mexico R. Co. v. Brownsville Nav. Dist., 304
U.S. 295 (1938); Midland Valley R. Co. v. Barkley, 276 U.S. 482 (1928); Texas & Pacific
R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
, •· 13 See, e.g., L.T. Barringer & Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 1 (1943); Manufacturer's
Ry. Co. v. United States, 246 U.S. 457 (1918); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union
Pacific iR. Co., 222 U.S. 541 (1912).
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consideration, however, the instant case is explainable on the principle that
where the ground of difference between court and agency can be isolated
and expressed as a general proposition applicable beyond the particular
case to all similar cases, the court will override the administrative determination.14 Thus the Court's ruling that the type of contract here involved
was illegal despite the agency's characterization of the scheme seems justifiable. The Supreme Court has recognized this principle at least impliedly
in holding that, where the ICC has fixed a rate which the judiciary feels is
less than reasonable in its application to all similarly situated carriers, the
court may send the determination back to that agency for further consideration.15 Explained in this manner, the principal case illustrates the often
subtle distinction between "interpretation" and "application" of statutory
language. While "application" technically may be said to involve interpre- •
tation on a narrow scale, it is to be differentiated from interpretation in its
broader sense- The process by which the general scope of statutory language
is determined constitutes "interpretation" and is properly for the court. The
process by which it is determined whether or not a given fact situation falls
within a legal category created by the statute is "application," and is properly for the agency. The principal case, explained on this ground as it must
be to avoid conflict with apparently analogous decisions,16 indicates a
tenuousness underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Under the
guise of "interpretation," courts may greatly restrict the authority of agen•
cies to "apply" the regulatory statutes. It would appear, therefore, that tlie
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is based not upon precedent but upon a
continuing judicial self-restraint.
Stephen B. Flood

14 See DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAw 168 (1927).
15 Southern Ry. Co. v. St. Louis Hay and Grain· Co., 214 U.S. 297 (1909). Cf. SEC
v. Central-Illinois Securities Corp., 338 U.S. 96 (1949); Railroad Retirement Board v.
Duquesne Warehouse Co., 326 U.S. 446 (1946); Otis &: Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624 (1945);
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore &: Ohio R. Co., 145 U.S. 263 (1892).
16 See cases cited in notes 12 and 13 supra.

